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ABSTRACT: Appellate rulings contribute to policy deliberations on uses of and parameters for expert testimony. 
As courts perform gatekeeping and evaluative roles, opinions highlight investigative independence, calculations 
of probability, and consistency across studies. Even so, the elements from expert testimony most commonly 
extended into precedent stand out for their summative concision and figurative cogency.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Testimony in court by victims of domestic abuse often is supplemented by expert testimony 
that modifies and supersedes a victim’s voice (Hamilton, 2010). Expert testimony also serves 
as an interpretive filter and evaluative caution when a jury evaluates the reliability of eye-
witness testimony (Terrance, Thayer, & Kehn, 2006; Cutler, Dexter, & Penrod, 1989). In both 
instances, the testimony introduces and explains criteria that a jury and judge use to 
understand, and at times reject, other testimony at trial. In some circumstances, attorneys also 
strategically use expert testimony to convey a defendant’s point of view while avoiding cross-
examination (Miller, 2003). Given these uses of external expertise in trials, often to filter and 
qualify factual accounts, the conditions under which such testimony is admitted, presented, and 
interpreted is a matter of significant interest. 
 Several factors influence procedural decisions on whether a court admits the 
testimony of an external expert on a given subject in a particular trial: policy preferences, role 
of requesting party, criteria used for evidentiary review, legal sub-domain, type of expertise, 
degree of consensus about a social problem and the sufficiency of existing legal solutions 
(Harris, 2008; Buchman, 2007). Less has been written, however, about the process in particular 
legal domains by which that expertise incrementally is naturalized. This essay uses the ideas of 
transmutation and adoption to describe a process by which knowledge and recommendations 
derived from a particular expertise are actively imported and incrementally reified. The 
analysis suggests that domain elaboration in legal sub-fields is solidified in a process of 
transmutation that distills elements with figurative cogency from expert narratives.  
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2. EXPERTISE EXTENSION IN DYNAMIC LEGAL FIELDS 
The case opinions analyzed in this study all evaluated uses of expert testimony to frame 
understandings of fact. Some cases cited expert testimony explicitly to revise a legal standard 
(State v. Henderson, 2011). In others, the original and declared purpose for the testimony was 
to make factual determinations in the case (State v. Haines, 2006; People v. Midyette, 2011). 
Nonetheless, as this analysis shows, even in those cases, the use of that testimony subtly 
developed elaborations and applications of legal doctrine. The expert testimony was interpreted 
and adopted in ways that developed law. 
 The sample consists primarily of two types of cases: (1) ones that involved allegations 
of domestic abuse, a subject matter concerning which courts and some legislatures increasingly 
have enshrined a right at trial to expert psychological testimony, and (2) cases in which 
eyewitness observations may have been contaminated by inappropriately suggestive line-up 
procedures or other reliability-decreasing factors. These two types of cases give the sample a 
limited and symmetrical diversity, particularly since the common exclusion at trial of expert 
testimony concerning suggestive line-up techniques typically benefits the prosecution, while 
the increasingly guaranteed right to call expert psychological testimony in cases of alleged 
battering benefits the defense, especially for the particular charge that generated public support 
for a statutory right to expert testimony, where a battery victim is charged with a crime against 
her abuser. Not only do these two types of cases reflect on the one hand a restrictive, and on 
the other a lighter, admission threshold for expert testimony, they also reflect tendencies in 
which the testimony carries different advantages for the prosecution and defense. As a whole, 
the sample shows distinctive proclivities in how expert testimony has been adopted into and 
transformed for legal understandings. 
 The study uses primarily three cases in which appellate courts ruled on matters of 
expert testimony. One modified the legal standard by which factors that reduce eyewitness 
reliability can be identified and mitigated (State v. Henderson, 2011). The original trial court 
convicted Larry Henderson of reckless manslaughter and aggravated assault, based primarily 
on his identification by James Womble, an eyewitness. The trial court allowed Womble’s 
testimony, based on a pre-trial hearing in which it found the police officers had not been 
“impermissibly suggestive,” even though Womble said in that hearing that the investigators 
had strongly “nudged” him to make a choice from a photo line-up of possible suspects. An 
appellate court reversed that ruling and, showing some uncertainty, requested certification of 
that decision from the state supreme court. The high court heard arguments from third parties 
that “raised questions about possible shortcomings in the [legal standard used].” As a result, 
the state supreme court appointed a Special Master to “evaluate the scientific and other 
evidence about eyewitness identifications” (p. 2). This testimony, summarized in a separate 
report and recounted at length in the court’s subsequent opinion, focused not on matters of fact 
decided by the trial court, but instead on the validity of the legal standard used to determine the 
reliability of eye-witness testimony. Based on the scientific evidence and expert testimony, the 
court recommended a revision of the law governing eye witness identifications.  
 In People v. Midyette (2011), the defense called Dr. Lenore Walker, a widely-cited 
social scientist whose work first identified and documented Battered Women’s Syndrome 
(BWS), for the purpose of showing that the defendant suffered from the syndrome, which may 
have contributed to her ineffective defense at trial. The expert testimony thus was not 
presented at the original trial, but instead on appeal at the district court, where the defendant 
argued that the testimony might effectively have been presented earlier, but for her emotional 
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and cognitive incompetence at that time. In this case, the district court allowed and heard the 
expert testimony, which it eventually found unpersuasive. The opinion included an 
explanation, offered by the district court, as to why the expert testimony was not persuasive. 
 In the third case, Ohio v. Haines (2006), the Ohio Supreme Court reversed convictions 
for some domestic assault charges, while leaving other assault convictions intact. The court let 
stand the trial court’s decision to allow expert testimony on BWS, but under the condition that 
the testimony address only the issue of social framework. The court found irreparable prejudice 
introduced when the expert presented at trial also a diagnostic opinion that the abuse victim 
suffered from BWS. According to the court, that diagnosis implied the alleged crimes had been 
committed and intruded on the jury’s fact-finding responsibility.  
 Finally, the study draws on multiple-cases analyses by Melissa Hamilton, Julie 
Stubbs, and Julia Tolmie, which place the use of expert testimony on domestic abuse within an 
evolving and dynamic context. Stubbs and Tolmie (1999) focused narrowly on the use of BWS 
testimony on behalf of defendants accused of murder or assault. In other words, they did not 
consider the testimony as used in prosecutions against the men perpetrating the abuse. Even in 
that limited context, however, they saw a developmental trajectory in Canadian and U.S. law, 
though it had not yet developed that way in Australian courts. In particular, they noted that 
expert testimony increasingly was used not just as evidence of a qualifying social framework, 
but also as a means for assessing responses by the abused women as plausible and 
“reasonable” defensive actions.  
 Hamilton focused on a presumably later stage of development in that general domain. 
She analyzed judicial uses of expert testimony in sixty-two appellate opinions presented in 
California between 1996 and 2004, particularly those in which the expert testimony was 
admitted “under a special evidentiary statute in a prosecution of a male abusing his female 
partner” (Hamilton, 2009, p. 61). California was unusual at that time for this type of testimony 
since in 1990 its legislature broadly guaranteed admission of such testimony in all domestic 
violence cases. While legislatures in other states authorized such testimony only as part of a 
defense by a woman accused of murdering her abuser—and appellate courts in other states 
used case law to allow testimony through case law (e.g., State v. Koss, 1990)—California was 
the first state to change evidence law to allow such expert testimony for all cases in which 
domestic abuse was alleged. Hamilton’s data sample of such testimony use documents the 
evolving relationship between the testimony and changing legal standards. 
3. PRESENTATION AND EXAMINATION OF TRANSMUTED EXPERTISE 
In order to give effectiveness to knowledge, people possessing specialized expertise testify in 
courts of law about scientific theories, patterns of behavior, and occasionally to justify medical 
diagnoses. In doing this, designated experts endeavor to make a kind of translation. Things that 
may be understood and discussed in one way among other experts of the same domain, perhaps 
more exactly, perhaps more technically, are presented in a court of law in such a way that 
ordinary non-specialists, primarily judges, lawyers, and members of a jury can understand and 
accept the primary claims. This act of translation requires all parties involved, the experts and 
non-experts, to find a middle ground, where some shared standards of validity can be applied 
to the matters in question. The parties must speak in an intermodal language that realizes, as 
Hans-Georg Gadamer put it, a “fusion” of linguistic and evaluative horizons (1997, p. 302). As 
the following analysis shows, the dimensions of expert testimony that broadly explain the 
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acceptance and uses of expertise in the sample opinions are allusions to professional 
consensus, selective indices of methodological validity, and illustrations of political and 
figurative cogency. 
3.1 Criterion of General Acceptance  
A common measure for admitting expert testimony is the prevalence of consensus among 
specialists. Insofar as a party or witness can show unanimity of opinion within a scientific or 
technical community, then the court generally may accede to the presentation of that evidence, 
that is, if the testimony also meets other criteria for admissibility, such as usefulness to the jury 
and relevance to one of the legal questions being considered. In one sense, this focus on 
possible scientific consensus is a legacy of the so-called Frye (1923) or “general acceptance” 
standard. It also may reflect a developmental model of scientific inquiry, alluded to by Harry 
Collins and Robert Evans (2007) in the distinction between disputed and consensual science 
(pp. 20–21). Thomas Kuhn’s well-known account of paradigm shifts in the development of 
science similarly reinforces this notion that divisions created by a revolutionary paradigm shift 
are eventually subsumed again in a newly stable comprehensive theory (1996). The criterion of 
unanimity serves the court as a sign of scientific validity and maturity. 
 The bane of a disputed science also has been used to disqualify marginal knowledge 
claims at the point of accepting or rejecting possible expert testimony. In the original Frye 
case, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s exclusion of testimony 
by which an expert offered to explain how a blood pressure test could be used to detect truth 
and lies. The criterion used to exclude that testimony in Frye (1923), and increasingly cited for 
that purpose since the 1970s, was that the scientific principle or discovery used as a basis for a 
deduction should be “sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the 
particular field in which it belongs” (as cited in Lyons, 1997, para. 4).  
 Following that prevailing Frye standard for admitting expert testimony, the Ohio 
Supreme Court first had ruled “no general acceptance of the expert’s methodology [on BSW] 
had been established” (State v. Thomas, 1981, p. 521). Nine years later, however, the same 
court explained that “since 1981, several books and articles have been written on this subject” 
(State v. Koss, 1990, p. 214). The opinion further explained that “[i]n jurisdictions which have 
been confronted with this issue, most have allowed expert testimony on the battered woman 
syndrome (p. 214). The court’s analysis suggested that over time a tipping point had been 
achieved, at which point the theory, together with its investigative methodology, was no longer 
characterized as disputed but instead as established science.  
 State v. Henderson (2011) too acknowledged an emergent scientific consensus about 
factors that may undermine the reliability of eyewitness identifications. Over the course of a 
ten-day remand hearing, a Special Master heard testimony from seven experts in the field and 
reviewed 360 exhibits, including more than 200 scientific studies on human memory and 
eyewitness identification. The eventual opinion considered particularly important the results of 
meta-analyses, which looked for statistical trends in all available results for certain types of 
studies. These meta-analyses, of which there were more than twenty-five, allowed a look at the 
degree of consensus across studies. The advantage of this kind of study, according to the court, 
was that “[t]he more consistent the conclusions from aggregated data, the greater confidence 
one can have in those conclusions” (p. 29). Furthermore, in two sections near the end of the 
opinion, the court described the degree of consensus the Special Master found among 
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scientists, expert witnesses who testified in person at the hearing, and people beyond the 
scientific community who were engaged in related law enforcement and reform efforts (pp. 
43–44). 
3.2 Fidelity to Ideal Models of Scientific or Diagnostic Methodology 
The evaluative standard of consensus, however, breaks down under conditions of shared 
mistake and habitual neglect. As the U.S. Supreme Court eventually noted in Daubert v. 
Merrell (1992), the “general acceptance” test for scientific knowledge does not independently 
justify exclusion of opinions and studies that, while not yet widely accepted, still represent 
valid findings. Sending the case back to a lower court for rehearing, the Court charged judges 
to evaluate scientific evidence based on specific criteria for scientific validity. For example, the 
opinion instructed judges to evaluate the question whether a study tested a theory that was in 
fact falsifiable, as well as whether it reported or otherwise quantified the margin of error. 
While it does not appear that courts as a whole have excluded or included more expert 
testimony since that decision (Buchman, 2007), many have hailed the decision as a procedural 
turning point, one that might embolden judges to be more active and articulate gatekeepers in 
qualifying and disqualifying testimony by experts (Gatowski et al., 2001).  
 Melissa Hamilton (2009) showed how external expertise was employed by trial and 
appellate courts at a time of self-conscious procedural transformation. She surveyed a broad set 
of appellate opinions in the State of California since the law had been changed to allow experts 
on domestic abuse to testify in trials, not only, as the original law had allowed, when the abuse 
victim defended herself against a charge of murder or assault, but also when the abuse victim 
spoke in court as a witness in a case against her alleged perpetrator of that abuse. Hamilton 
examined the differences that emerged in the uses of expert testimony in those cases, as well as 
the criteria applied in evaluating the validity and relevance of that testimony.  
 The opinions Hamilton reviewed frequently noted calculations of probability that 
experts reported. These statistical figures represented a tangible measure, an epistemic product 
that the testimony in given cases yielded. In separate instances, the judges affirmed that a 
particular claim had been shown by a named expert to have a given percentage of probable 
truth. These figures thus were implicit quantifications of likely error. Whether or not this 
probability of truth had any relevant relationship to levels of certitude required for different 
charges (e.g., “beyond a reasonable doubt” or a “preponderance of evidence”) was not possible 
to discern from the opinions. Still, the regularity with which the opinions alluded to indices of 
probability suggested that the figures served an epistemic function in representing factual 
validity. 
 Nonetheless, when these opinions are read in aggregate, the seeming crispness of the 
probability calculations was fuzzier than in individual reports. Some testimony focused on the 
likelihood that battered women recanted earlier accusations they had made. Estimates ranged 
from “around 50” to 85 percent. In two instances, the very same experts testified to different 
rates of recantation in different trials. Although Hamilton granted there may have been some 
operational difference between “refusal to cooperate” and “becoming uncooperative,” she still 
was troubled by the variation of percentages, as well as the lack of background information 
retained in the record to help explain the discrepancies (2009, pp. 102–103). Hamilton also 
found significant discrepancies in the reports on the number of times women typically tried to 
leave a relationship before successfully doing so. Some opinions reported that number to be 
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five to seven times, one as three to five times, and another as an average of five times (2009, p. 
111).  
 Particularly striking to Hamilton in her review of these opinions was the lack of 
attention given to issues of validity and methodology in assessments of this expert testimony. 
She wrote: 
Many courts report the expert testifying about the prevalence of recantation, denial, and 
minimization (e.g., commonly, frequently) without providing any research support for their 
characterizations, even when citing specific statistics (e.g., 71% of battered women recant). . . . As a 
sociologist, I clamor for more details regarding the source material, such as the date any study was 
done, the research methodology used, the identity of the primary investigators, or any other 
information that could reveal bias or overgeneralization. (Hamilton, 2009, p. 110) 
From the perspective of an outsider looking in, the appellate opinions seemed unreflective at 
best and even cavalier in how minimally they summarized and evaluated scientific knowledge 
about psychological phenomena.  
 Recently, a district court in Colorado used performance criteria to the evaluate the 
testimony of a renowned expert on BWS, Dr. Lenore Walker (State v. Midyette, 2011). This 
case differed from the set of opinions Hamilton reviewed since the appellate court itself heard 
the expert testimony and evaluated its validity. The case also was different in that the expert 
offered an opinion that the claimant suffered from the syndrome. In other words, the expert 
presented a particular diagnosis, rather than just a description of a more general phenomenon 
or scientific theory. In evaluating the validity of that testimony, the court cited a competing 
expert, Dr. William Hansen, who had been introduced by the prosecution. According to 
Hansen, a forensic interview and evaluation of the type Dr. Walker had conducted required 
“more than a client’s self report” (State v. Midyette, 2011, p. 8). Citing guidelines described by 
Hansen, the court noted: 
Evaluators ask attorneys for information, but it is the evaluator’s responsibility to get whatever is 
missing, particularly prior mental health history. He noted that Dr. Walker did not have Defendant’s 
therapist’s notes and was not even aware that Defendant had been in counseling. (State v. Midyette, 
2011, p. 8) 
In rejecting the expert’s diagnosis, the court noted the limited observations Walker had made 
of the claimant, the mixed answers she gave about the method for scoring personality tests, and 
the extent to which she had allowed the claimant’s lawyer to edit and shape her report.  
3.3 Figurative Cogency and Political Knowledge 
Figurative cogency refers to a form of cultural accretion in which a symbolic construction 
works in a communicative locale as a vehicle for summing up a perception or judgment. For 
example, in describing a “geographics of identity,” Susan Stanford Friedman characterized a 
type of experience in which elements of “cultural hybridity” attain a “material reality[,] 
political urgency[, and] figurative cogency” (2000). Such an identity-forging construction also 
describes the process by which external expertise, once admitted to the court room and 
transmuted into actual and prospective meaning, enters the language of the court and 
subsequent appellate guidance.  
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 In her analysis of appellate opinions in California on domestic abuse cases, Hamilton 
(2009) noted the regularity and consistency with which the opinions adopted metaphoric 
language from the expert testimony, as well as the ease with which metaphoric language came 
to represent factual reality in descriptions of experience and patterns of behavior. The most 
common metaphors were accounts of “power and control,” the “cycle of violence,” a 
“honeymoon period, and “window of opportunity” (p. 112). Often the court summarized how 
certain actions or patterns of behavior by a man reinforced an expectation for a special “male 
privilege” and a corresponding female responsibility. For example, one cited expert explained 
how abusive behaviors served a man’s “need to feel like the ‘king of the castle’” (p. 114). 
Another testified that the man’s “masculinity is based on the extent of power and control over 
his female partner, whom he sees as his property” (p. 114). These illustrations of the drive for 
power and control were often associated with the linked metaphor of a cycle of violence, which 
characterized the repetitive pattern that conditioned and propelled the parties’ behavior and 
responses.  
 Striking about Hamilton’s finding is the degree to which these essentially metaphoric 
resources stood out in the legal record as higher profile traces of the testimony’s legacy in the 
law than any assessment of the science or diagnostic accuracy of that testimony. In the set of 
opinions Hamilton studied, “the court opinions were far more likely to embrace a definition [of 
BWS] originating in a legal precedent . . . [than by invoking Lenore] Walker or other authority 
external to the law” (2009, pp. 78–81). In a similar and parallel way, the opinions generally 
avoided describing the situations in the cases as “psychological conditions” or by using 
“clinical terminology” (2009, p. 81). 
 Hamilton (2009) offered two explanations for this preference for testimony elements 
that either cited precedent or represented figurative cogency. The first was that they provided a 
mechanism for understanding the possible reasonableness of the beliefs held by and actions 
taken by the involved parties. She noted that “judicial writings utilize these particular phrases 
and often expound upon them to create judicial knowledge about the dynamics of abusive 
relationships and, more particularly, to account for the women’s seemingly vulnerable 
emotional states and inexplicable behaviors” (p. 117). The metaphoric resources cited from the 
expert testimony thus serve as a kind of bridge between worlds. It helps judges map, as 
Friedman (2000) might say, an otherwise unfamiliar and hybrid terrain.  
 In addition to this function of epistemic mapping, the prominence of these interlinked 
metaphors also served to represent for the court a context for possible legal or other remedial 
action. Experts used the term “window of opportunity” to refer to a period of time that recurred 
within the “cycle of violence,” during which a battered woman could extricate herself from the 
cycle and from her relationship with the abuser (Hamilton, 2009, p. 117). The significance for 
the court in this “window” was that, according to the experts’ recounted narratives, the 
woman’s ability to use that period of time to escape the cycle often depended on 
encouragement and support of others who could assist the woman in breaking the cycle (pp. 
117–118). The metaphor thus served as a framing device to underscore the possible importance 
of external actions, as a verdict might be, that could hold a perpetrator accountable. 
 Extensions of expert testimony, particularly in cases concerning BWS, can also 
substantially transform the character and meaning of underlying law. Robert Mosteller (1996) 
observed “political influence” in how courts used and built on social framework or “group 
character” evidence. Of course, in several cases, political bodies explicitly approved statutes in 
evidence law to guarantee BWS testimony in specific kinds of cases. At the same time, though, 
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other state courts expanded this right to plaintiffs and witnesses for defenses other than 
coercion, and in ways quite distinct from the more restrictive rulings courts have made in other 
legal sub-domains, such as the potentially parallel issue of potentially unreliable eyewitness 
identifications (1996, pp. 485–491).  
 The plausibly political influence in how expert testimony has been admitted and used 
of course may not necessarily be a bad thing. Mosteller (1996) characterized this influence not 
only as a form of pressure and advocacy by interest groups, but also as a modality in which a 
“moral component” is “integrated and incorporated into the law” (pp. 465-466, note 15.) 
Mosteller wrote:  
The broad political consensus is both that social reality of the battering relationship is badly 
imbalanced and that the legal process has not appropriately responded to self-help violence by 
women. As a result, and despite scientific uncertainty about the existence of a true syndrome, the 
judgment is that jurors should nevertheless receive such evidence to help redress the imbalance. 
(1996, pp. 490-1) 
The selective use of expert testimony about group character thus appears to institute a 
substantive and normative change in the processes and standards applied. It represents a 
change in the scope and force of law, primarily to solve a widely acknowledged social and 
adjudicatory problem. 
4. CONCLUSION  
The appellate opinions reviewed here show both openness and caution about the uses of 
external expertise by courts to frame and construe factual assessments. Concerning the matter 
of domestic abuse and its possible long-term effects on victims, the opinions readily adopted 
metaphoric representations of the violent relationships and consistently relied on definitions 
and explanations of the phenomenon that reinforced through cited precedent to stand as 
provisional legal categories. In the matter of potentially prejudicial eyewitness testimony, the 
cases studies showed an opposite tendency: extreme caution, even aversion, to any blanket 
presumption for expert testimony at trial when such concerns are raised. Instead, in the one 
specific case reviewed here (State v. Hendersen, 2011), the New Jersey Supreme Court held a 
specialized hearing that re-evaluated scientific research on the subject and, finding 
inadequacies in the prevailing legal standard, recommended procedural adjustments in pre-trial 
hearings and new directives for model jury charges.  
 The opinions showed significant deference for generalizations and causal theories 
presented by the subject matter experts. In part, this caution may have been due to the exacting 
“abuse of discretion” standard used for reversals of trial court decisions on controversial 
testimony. Still, the opinions also accepted many elements of the testimony at face value. This 
was particularly true of metaphoric renderings of reality that were consistent with familiar 
precedent, previous expert testimony, and political consensus about legal problems and 
possible solutions. While the opinions referred to various standards of scientific reliability, for 
the most part they did not delve meaningfully into matters of methodology or research design.  
 Even so, in spite of this tendency to grant scientific expertise a general and 
autonomous credibility, the opinions also fiercely guarded other knowledge prerogatives for 
judges and triers of fact. This reluctance to cede adjudicative authority was most striking in 
State v. Haines (2006) and State v. Midyette (2011). Yet it also animated the strictly procedural 
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refashioning of the legal standard in State v. Hendersen (2011). While that decision left trial 
courts the discretion in cases where witness reliability was challenged to allow expert 
testimony at the request of parties, the decision did not suggest case-specific expert testimony 
as a possible or preferred course of action. When the question was particular, as to whether a 
given witness was reliable or a particular defendant a recipient of abuse, the courts appeared to 
tighten the standard of admissibility for expert opinion. Overall, the court was most willing to 
hear and admit expert testimony on scientific questions if it could extract and retain 
figuratively cogent traces of the testimony, in the form of precedential legal accretion, while 
guarding against practices in the testimony that could potentially displace or usurp the voices 
of actual parties and witnesses of fact.  
REFERENCES 
Buchman, J. (2007). The effects of ideology on federal trial judges’ decisions to admit scientific expert testimony. 
American Politics Research, 35, 670–693. doi: 10.1177/1532673X07302339. 
Collins, H. & Evans. R. (2007). Rethinking Expertise. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Cutler, B. L., Dexter, H. R., & Penrod, S. D. (1989). Expert testimony and jury decision making: An empirical 
analysis. Behavioral Sciences & The Law, 7(2), 215–225. 
Friedman, S. S. (2000, September). Locational feminism: Gender, cultural geographies, and geopolitical literacy. 
Paper presented at 4th European Feminist Research Conference, Bologna, Italy. Retrieved from 
http://www.women.it/quarta/workshops/literatures7/sstanford.htm  
Frye v. United States of America. (1923). 54 App. D.C. 46, 293 F.1013.  
Gadamer, H. (2004). Truth and method (2nd rev. ed.). ( J. Weinsheimer & D. G. Marshall, Trans.). New York, NY: 
Crossroad. 
Gatowski, S. I., Dobbin, S. A., Richardson, J. T., Ginsburg, G. P., Merlino, M. L., & Dahir, V. (2001). Asking the 
gatekeepers: A national survey on judging expert evidence in a post-Daubert world. Law and Human 
Behavior, 25(5), 433–458. Retrieved from JSTOR database.  
Hamilton, M. (2009). Expert testimony on domestic violence. El Paso, TX: LFB Scholarly Publishing.  
Hamilton, M. (2010). Judicial discourses on women’s agency in violent relationships: Cases from California. 
Women’s Studies International Forum, 33(6), 570–578. doi:10.1016/j.wsif.2010.09.007 
Harris, R. C. (2008). Black robes, white coats: The puzzle of judicial policymaking and scientific evidence. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. 
Kuhn, T. S. (1996). The structure of scientific revolution (3rd ed.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Lyons, T. (1997). Frye, Daubert, and where do we go from here? Rhode Island Bar Journal, 45, 5–12. Retrieved 
from Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe database. 
Miller, R. D. (2003). Testimony by proxy: The use of expert testimony to provide defendant testimony without 
cross-examination. Journal of Psychiatry and the Law, 31, 21–41. 
Mosteller, R. P. (1996). Syndromes and politics in criminal trials and evidence law. Duke Law Journal, 46(3), 
461–516. 
People v. Midyette. (2011). Retrieved from http://www.thedenverchannel.com/download/2011/1122/ 
29828345.pdf 
State v. Haines. (2006). 112 Ohio St.3d 393. 
State v. Hendersen. (2011). Unapproved syllabus. Ohio Supreme Court, Office of the Clerk. Retrieved from 
http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/nj/Henderson-A8-08.pdf 
State v. Koss. (1990). 49 Ohio St. 3d 213.  
State v. Thomas. (1981). 66 Ohio St. 2d 518. 
Stubbs, J. & Tolmie, J. (1999). Falling short of the challenge? A comparative assessment of the Australian use of 
expert evidence on the battered woman syndrome. Melbourne University Law Review. 23, 709–747. 
Terrance, C., Thayer, A., & Kehn, A. (2006). Undermining eyewitness confidence inflation: Effecting change 
through expert testimony. Journal Of Forensic Psychology Practice, 6(1), 73–82. 
doi:10.1300/J158v06n01_05

  
 
